are often judged, and there is as a result a strong need for indicators of the extent to which social institutions embody these characteristics and lead to "fair" outcomes. This has long been the case and in fact is one of the principal reasons the degree of intergenerational income mobility is viewed as being policy relevant. If the tie between the adult outcomes of children and their family background is rather loose then in some sense the playing field might be thought of as level, children's position in the income distribution being the result of their own efforts rather than accidents of birth. As such the degree of intergenerational mobility is perceived as being closely related to social inclusion and equality of opportunity, ethics that are widely accepted, often legitimize public institutions, and as a result are central to a sense of shared destiny.
In this chapter, I will formally discuss the relationship between equality of opportunity and intergenerational income mobility. Many of the subsequent chapters document difficulties in obtaining accurate estimates of the correlation between parent and child incomes, offer new estimates, or offer comparisons between countries or across time. It may well be that the intergenerational correlation of incomes is higher in one Chapter 3 -page 2 country than previously thought because of measurement issues, or higher than in some other country, or has changed through time, but how ultimately are we to interpret a "high" or "low" correlation? How "high" is too "high"? When have we reached a situation that can be described as reflecting equality of opportunity? The empirical literature never explicitly addresses these questions with the result that readers may implicitly begin to assume that equality of opportunity holds if the rows of the intergenerational income transition matrix are identical, if an individual's chances of occupying the various income levels are independent of the income of their parents. I will argue that this desideratum is associated with a quite special view of equality of opportunity, a view that only a fraction of those who consider the issue would, upon reflection, endorse.
A Framework for Conceptualizing Equality of Opportunity
My starting point is a conceptualization of equality of opportunity that formalizes the "level the playing field" view that I have presented in Roemer (1998 Roemer ( , 2002 . Five words comprise the language of this approach. The objective is the aspect of well-being that the policy maker wants to equalize opportunities for-in the current project, this is for the most part income. Circumstances are the aspects of the environments of individuals that affect their achievement of the objective, and for which the society in question does not wish to hold individuals responsible. Generally, circumstances are thought to be environmental influences that are beyond the control of individuals. A type is the set of individuals in the society who share the same circumstances. Effort comprises the totality of actions of the individual that affect his or her achievement of the objective, and for Chapter 3 -page 3 which society does hold the individual responsible. Finally, the instrument is the policy that can be manipulated in order to change the value of the objective. The equalopportunity policy is the value of the instrument such that the achievement of the objective of individuals shall be a function only of their efforts, not of their circumstances. In other words, the instrument is used to compensate those with disadvantageous circumstances so that in the end they have the same chances of acquiring high values of the objective as do those with advantageous circumstances. To be more precise, equality-of-opportunity has been achieved when all those who expend the same degree of effort, regardless of their type, have the same chances of achieving the objective.
In particular, equality-of-opportunity (EOp) views inequalities of outcome as indefensible, ethically speaking, when and only when they are due to differential circumstances. Inequalities due to differential effort are acceptable. In this way, EOp differs from equality-of-outcome, which treats all inequalities in the achievement of the objective as ethically indefensible. Equality of opportunity could be achieved, perhaps, by starving everyone, so that everyone achieves a zero level of the objective. To be a palatable approach EOp, as I have just defined it, must be combined with some conception of efficiency. I will discuss this briefly toward the end of the chapter.
In applications of this approach, one usually specifies a small set of circumstances that are measurable in the population under consideration. One then partitions the population into types according to these circumstances, and then attributes the observed variation of the objective to differential effort. Thus, effort is treated as the residual. It is Chapter 3 -page 4 therefore important to try and capture the most important circumstances in the set of "circumstances."
For the most part there is a unique circumstance in all of the following chapters of this volume: the income of a person's parent. The objective is the income of the child in adulthood. The relationship between the circumstance and the objective can be described in terms of an intergenerational correlation, or more specifically as an intergenerational transition matrix. For the sake of exposition I focus on the latter. The intergenerational transition matrix is a table whose ij th entry is the fraction of children whose parent or parents earned income level i, and who in turn earn income level j. The implicit social goal is to achieve a transition matrix whose rows are identical. The fact that children end up in all positions of the income distribution rather than always occupying the same position as their parents-that the rows of the transition matrix are positive vectors and not unit vectors-is due to differential effort, or perhaps differential abilities. In the latter case, the policy maker or society would not oppose differential rewards to those of differential ability, even if ability were something beyond the control of the individual. I do not focus on the instrument through which this would be achieved, but this is discussed more explicitly in other chapters, particularly Chapter 12: presumably educational investment would play a large role.
How do parents affect the chances for acquisition of income of their children?
This is certainly a matter for some discussion, and while some of the issues are also discussed in many of the other chapters, I will assume that the influence of parents occurs through at least the following four channels: (C1) provision of social connections; (C2)
formation of beliefs and skills in children through family culture and investment; (C3)
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I have listed these in the order that I think most readers would choose as the right order for inclusion in the set of circumstances for EOp policy: that is, most people think that equality of opportunity requires "leveling the playing field" with regard to inequalities of opportunity due to differential family connections; a somewhat smaller number of people would endorse a policy that would also count individuals as disadvantaged due to their being raised in families that inculcated them with pessimistic beliefs about what they could become, or did not invest in their skills; a smaller number still would compensate individuals not only for C1 and C2 but also for low innate ability; and the smallest number would compensate individuals in addition for the influence of family upbringing on their preferences. I am not sure about the ordering of the last two channels. As an economist, I differentiate between beliefs and skills on the one hand, and preferences/aspirations on the other. A sociologist might not parse the characteristics in this manner. The chief preference with which I am concerned is the income-leisure preference, or income-occupational choice preference.
When it is said that applicants for positions in social institutions (firms, universities) should be considered only on their merits, we are explicitly ruling out "social connections" as a legitimate characteristic for candidates. Thus, the practice of nepotism-of hiring relatives of incumbent members of the firm-is an anti-EOp policy, as is admitting preferentially to Ivy League schools the children of alumni. But merit might include ability, in which case a meritocratic view would not endorse counting C3
as circumstances. When education is focused upon as an instrument for equalizing opportunities, the hope is that public educational investment will compensate for
Chapter 3 -page 6 inadequacies of family culture, mainly through channel C2. (Education can also work through compensation of disadvantage in channels C3 and C4.) Because the meritocratic view usually encompasses the legitimacy of returns to ability, it is in conflict with some versions of equality of opportunity-I think this is an important point.
Why do I place "family influence on preferences" as the last channel? Clearly, we do want to counteract preferences that we think are self-defeating in children, which may be a consequence of their upbringing. The reason this channel is listed last is that most people would say adults should be responsible for their preferences-in particular, with regard to pursuit of economic opportunities-even if those preferences are in large part the consequence of upbringing. The key here is that, even though one's preferences may have been instilled to a large extent in childhood, one acquires responsibility for them if one comes to identify with them. As Ronald Dworkin writes, a person should be held responsible for his preferences if and when he is glad he has them (Dworkin 1981) . This excludes addictions and compulsions, which are preferences one would prefer not to have, but not income-occupational choice preferences.
Equality of Opportunity and Intergenerational Mobility
For the sake of argument, let us accept two things: first, the four kinds of circumstance listed exhaust the set of parental influences on child incomes; and second, the set of parental influences is "nested" in this order, with regard to arguable inclusion in the set of circumstances for EOp policy. If so, then we have four associated conceptions of equality of opportunity, each associated with four possible sets of circumstances:
EOp1: Circumstances = C1
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EOp2: Circumstances = C1 U C2 EOp3: Circumstances = C1 U C2 U C3 EOp4: Circumstances = C1 U C2 U C3 U C4
Before inquiring how the study of intergenerational income transition matrices (IITM) is related to equality of opportunity, it will be useful to describe how one would ideally study equality of opportunity, with regard to the above conceptions.
Let me suggest an amendment of the objective in the IITM studies, which is taken to be market income or, as I will refer to it, "pre-fisc" income. Arguably, "post-fisc" income-that is income after taxes and government transfers-is a more attractive objective since it is a more proximate measure of consumption opportunities. With the choice of pre-fisc income in the IITM approach, one is implicitly thinking of the instrument as public educational investment; with post-fisc income as the objective, one also includes income taxation and transfer as possible instruments.
Denote the relevant characteristics as follows: a person's type, as characterized by the characteristics of his or her parents is t, preferences are p, and ability is a. Effort is viewed as the consequence of the exercise of preferences. Furthermore, suppose that it can be established (through econometric analysis) that an individual's preferences are the sum of parental influences and an element of autonomous preference formation: namely,
, where f is for family and s is for self. The instrument is j, and it can include both education and tax policy. The individual's post-fisc income is y = y (a, p,j, t).
(Econometrically, there will be an error term as well.) Thus, we suppose that once ability, preferences, and policy are fixed, the only predictable variation in income is due to type, as indicated by characteristics of family upbringing. Finally, I propose the following What is the analogous exercise with regard to EOp3? Personally, I do not see why some individuals should have fewer consumption opportunities than others because of possessing inferior native ability. With EOp3, it becomes particularly important that we include fiscal policy as an instrument, because a market economy cannot be expected to deliver pre-fisc incomes that are insensitive to ability. But fiscal policy can compensate, in principle at least, for ability disadvantage. The ideal of EOp3 will be achieved when
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In other words, the distribution of income is independent of parental characteristics and ability of individuals, but not of the parental component of preferences.
Finally, it is worthwhile to present the necessary condition for the achievement of EOp4. It is defined as:
That is to say, the policy should compensate individuals for their types, their abilities, and the influence of family on their preferences. Only the income consequences of the autonomous part of preferences are left uncompensated. Individuals are held responsible for these and they will generate inequalities in the objective. Autonomous preferences determine the effort of individuals, which determines their income, given type, ability, the parental preference factor, and policy.
Thus, in general equality of specified income distribution functions is a necessary condition for various conceptions of equal opportunity, given the assumption A*. But what is the relationship between these three versions of equality of opportunity? It is immediately clear that the conclusion of inference (3) implies the conclusion of inference (2), which in turn implies the conclusion of inference (1). On this basis it is now possible to examine how IITM studies can be understood. The ideal in these studies is that for each parental-characteristic-type, the distributions of income of children should be the same, namely:
(IIT
M)
That is to say:
Chapter 3 -page 10
But this is the only valid implication among these four conceptions of EOp. Why, for example, does the conclusion of (2) not imply (IITM)? In general this is the case because the distribution of p f will differ in types t 1 and t 2 .
Thus, in the presence of A* , IITM is a necessary condition for EOp4, the most radical conception of equality of opportunity. In contrast, suppose we have: (B*) The joint distribution of (a, p) is identical in all types. Denote that common probability measure byY. Then, by definition, for any t: F t = ∫ F tap dY (a, p) and it follows that:
But the assumption that the distribution of (a, p) is independent of type is a poor one. So, assuming that we can identify these various distributions of agent characteristics, the only robust implication appears to be that IITM, in the presence of A*, is a necessary condition for EOp4.
Summary
In this chapter I have made precise the meaning of "equality of opportunity" and suggest that it does not, except under rather extreme circumstances, imply complete intergenerational income mobility. The suggestion that equality of opportunity is reflected in a situation of no association at all between parent and child incomes is difficult to accept for the following reasons. First, complete intergenerational mobility, as reflected for example in an intergenerational income transition matrix with equal entries Chapter 3 -page 11 regardless of parental income, is a necessary condition for only the most radical conception of equality of opportunity, one that I have termed EOp4. This conception implies policy makers should level the playing field by eliminating the influence of not only social connections, family culture and investment, and the genetic transmission of ability, but also of the influence of family background on the formation of preferences and aspirations among children. In my view this is not a conception that most people currently endorse. Second, most analyses of intergenerational mobility are based on market incomes and market economies cannot be expected to equalize market incomes independent of ability. Consequently if policy makers adopt an interpretation of equality of opportunity as given by EOp4 as their social goal, then income after taxes and transfers must be used as the objective. Finally, parental education-rather than income-is arguably a better proxy for the influences that impact upon the preferences and aspirations of children. The analytical basis for a discussion of EOp4 would have to move beyond intergenerational income mobility to parental education and status.
I should also re-iterate a point about efficiency made in section 1. Equalizing distribution functions can be accomplished by starving everyone: what societies really desire is to equalize distribution functions "at the highest possible levels." It is beyond the scope of this chapter to show exactly how this is done: one wishes to "maximize the minimum distribution function," but there are various procedures for doing this, which I discuss in Roemer (2002) . In simple cases, this amounts to maximizing the average value of the objective for the most disadvantaged type. Where an unambiguously most disadvantaged type does not exist, the policy maker maximizes the average value of the Chapter 3 -page 12 objective along the left-hand envelope of the distribution functions that are appropriate for the version of EOp in question.
In conclusion, I wish to say that my critique should not be taken to nullify our interest in estimates of intergenerational income mobility. In many countries this is the best we can do in studying equality of opportunity given the data that are available.
Indeed, my co-authors and I have recently published a multi-country study that takes statement IITM as the necessary condition of equal opportunity (Roemer et al., 2002) .
Nevertheless, the availability of sophisticated data sets should enable researchers to test for equality of opportunity according to the EOp2 and EOp3 views that I have described-the elimination of influences associated with social connections and family culture, and in addition with the genetic transmission of ability-as such studies would be more in tune with the current egalitarian sentiments of democratic polities.
